Abstract
Introduction
Secure group communication (SGC) is defined as the process by which members in a group can securely communicate with each other and the information being shared is inaccessible to anybody outside the group. In such a sce- * The authors are listed in the alphabetic order of their last names.
nario, a group key is established among all the participating members and this key is used to encrypt all the messages destined to the group. As a result, only the group members can decrypt the messages. The group key management protocols are typically classified in four categories: centralized group key distribution (CGKD), de-centralized group key management (DGKM), distributed/contributory group key agreement (CGKA), and distributed group key distribution (DGKD). (1) In CGKD, there exists a central entity (i.e. a group controller GC) which is responsible for generating, distributing, and updating the group key. The most famous CGKD scheme is the key tree scheme (also called Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) in some papers). This scheme was independently proposed by several research groups nearly at the same time [33, 34, 12, 24] , followed by many researchers proposing improvements and enhancements [11, 19, 21, 23, 25, 29, 30, 37] . ( 2) The DGKM approach involves splitting a large group into small subgroups. Each subgroup has a subgroup controller which is responsible for the key management of its subgroup. Subgroup controllers are also in charge of relaying encrypted data messages. The first DGKM scheme to appear was IOLUS [22] . There followed some improvements and hierarchical group key management schemes [6, 9, 13, 27, 29] . (3) The CGKA schemes involve the participation by all members of a group towards key management. Such schemes are characterized by the absence of the GC. The group key in such schemes is a function of the secret shares contributed by the members. Being contributory in nature, the distributed schemes help in the uniform distribution of the work-load for key management and eliminate the requirement for a central trusted entity. Typical CGKA schemes include binary tree based ones [14, 18] and n-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement [2, 10, 17, 8, 31, 18] . (4) The DGKD scheme, proposed in [1] , eliminates the need for a trusted central authority and introduces the concepts of sponsors and codistributors. All group members have the same capability and are equally trusted. Also, they have equal responsibility, i.e. any group member could be a potential sponsor of other members or a co-distributor. Whenever a member joins or leaves the group, the member's sponsor initiates the rekeying process. The sponsor generates the necessary keys and securely distributes the keys to co-distributors respectively. The co-distributors then distribute in parallel, corresponding keys to corresponding members. In addition to the above four typical classes of key management schemes, there are some other forms of key management schemes such as hierarchy and cluster based ones [6, 16] . The paper in [28] presents a good survey of earlier group key management schemes and the book [38] presents a comprehensive coverage of SGC as well as secure dynamic conferencing (SDC) and hierarchical access control (HAC).
Wireless networks, in particular mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and wireless sensor networks, have revolutionized the field of data networking with applications in numerous fields. MANETs can be used in all those situations where there is no time or resources available to setup a backbone network or infrastructure. With their increasing usage, secure group communication over such networks becomes vital. In MANETs, since there is no pre-defined/fixed infrastructure, a central authority is not usually available, and there are generally equivalent leveles of power and trust (or to say, untrust) among the participating members. A contributory group key agreement scheme is most appropriate for SGC in this kind of environment. Several group key management schemes have been proposed for SGC in wireless networks [3, 7, 15, 20, 26, 32, 35, 36] . Recently, Balachandran et al. proposed such a contributory key agreement protocol for MANETs, called CRTDH [5] . This protocol is based upon both the Chinese Remainder Theorem and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. CRTDH exhibits a very nice idea, but contains some problems that make it impractical in terms of efficiency and security. We point out three such problems: low efficiency, possibly a small key, and possessing the same Least Common Multiple (LCM), and propose a solution to them. Analysis and experiments are also presented which show that our improved protocol outperforms the original CRTDH protocol in terms of both efficiency and security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly introduce the original CRTDH protocol. In Section 3 we point out problems with CRTDH and propose improvements. Section 4 includes a performance analysis and experimental comparison between the original and improved CRTDH. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
A brief description of the original CRTDH key agreement protocol
For simplicity, we use the following notations. 
Group key establishment
Every group member U i does as follows.
• Step 1.1. Selects a DH private share x i , computes y i = g x i mod p.
• Step 1.2. Broadcasts y i .
•
• Step 1.5. Selects random k i , D i , and P i such that k i < min j =i {m ij } and D i = k i , and gcd(P i , lcm i )=1.
• Step 1.6. Solves the congruences
and broadcasts crt i .
• Step 1.7. Computes k j and the group key GK as k j = crt j mod m ij , j = i, and GK = k 1 ⊕k 2 ⊕. . .⊕k n .
The CRTDH join operation
Suppose that U n+j (1 ≤ j ≤ l) are going to join the group.
• Step 2.1.
Step 1.4 as lcm n+j = LCM 1≤t≤l; t =j {m n+j,n+t }, execute Steps 1.5-1.6 with i, j (n < i,j < n + l), and broadcast crt n+j , y n+j .
• Step 2.3.
and compute the new group key as
The CRTDH leave operation
Suppose that n > s > 1 and U s+j (1 ≤ j ≤ n − s) are going to leave. 3 The CRTDH problems and improvements
Problems in the original CRTDH
There are some problems with the CRTDH scheme which we discuss below as follows. Problem 1. In Step 1.4, the value of lcm i can be as large as
which can be prohibitively large since p is large and n is not very small, and then the storage needed for and operations (e.g., in Step 1.6) on lcm i might not be practical.
Problem 2.
Since x i are chosen independently by U i , it is possible that some of the m ij in step 1.3 are small. If so, the randomness of k i in Step 1.5 is affected and the security strength may be reduceid.
Problem 3.
Because of the fact that the LCM for a given set of numbers is not unique to the given set, the "same LCM" problem can occur. In other words, there can be more numbers that are added to a set and still result in the same LCM value. For example, LCM{4,6,8}=LCM{4,6,8,12}=24. Adding 12 into the previous set or removing 12 from the later set will not change the LCM value of 24. This could cause problems in the member join and member leave operations. Let us consider the member join operation first. The problem arises if the shared DH key between the existing user and the newly joined member does not affect the LCM of the new set. This could lead to breaching of backward secrecy: the new member would be able to obtain the secret share of the existing members. As for the member leave operation, the problem arises once again if the new LCM value without the departing member, is the same as the LCM value when the departing member was still in the group. In such a case, the departing member would still be able to decrypt new messages (so violating forward secrecy).
A modified key agreement protocol
The above problems can be resolved by modifying the CRTDH protocol as follows.
Steps 1. Step 1.4 will be removed.
Step 1.5 . For a given j = i, U i chooses P ij such that gcd(P ij , m ij ) = 1.
Step 1.6 . For j = i, U i uses the following new congruences to replace the original ones:
where D i is the same as in Step 1.6. U i also broadcasts the set of pairs
Each group member U j finds his own matched crt ij (i = j) from crt i broadcast by U i . Note that usually, we have crt ij = crt ji .
Step 1.7 . U i Computes crt ji mod m ij , j = i, which must be k j since m ij = m ji , and then computes GK = k 1 ⊕ k 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ k n , which is the group key.
A modified join operation
Step 2.1 is the same as Step 2.1, i.e., U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) compute the hash value h(GK). One of them, say U 1 , transmits h(GK) and
Step 2.2 . U n+j (1 ≤ j ≤ l) execute Steps 1.1 -1.2 , execute Step 1.3 only for m n+j,n+t (1 ≤ t ≤ l; t = j), and execute Steps 1.5 -1.6 only for crt n+j,n+1 (1 ≤ t ≤ l; t = j), i.e., compute and broadcast y n+j and crt n+j = {crt n+j,n+t : 1 ≤ t ≤ l; t = j}.
Step 2.3 .
by using the method in Step 1.7 , and compute the new group key as
A modified leave operation
Suppose that n > s > 1 and U s+j (1 ≤ j ≤ n − s) are going to leave.
Step 3.1 . One of U i (1 ≤ i ≤ s), say U 1 , redoes Steps 1.5 -1.6 with a new k 1 , broadcasts the new crt 1 = {crt 1,t : 2 ≤ t ≤ s}, and computes the new group key GK new = GK ⊕ k 1 .
Step 3.2 . U i (2 ≤ i ≤ s) recover k 1 from crt 1 and then compute the new group key GK new = GK ⊕ k 1 .
It is worthy to mention that CRTDH, including the above improvement, does not perform user authentication in the key agreement process, thus, suffering from the Man-in-theMiddle attack. The detail discussion of such a problem and one possible solution can be found in [39] .
Performance analysis
In this section, we analyze the complexities of the improved protocol and the CRTDH protocol. We also performed experiments on both protocols and the experimental results are presented here.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose p is the system prime and n is the group size, then the time complexity executing the CRTDH protocol is O(n 2 lg p) while the time complexity executing the improved protocol is O(nlg p). Thus, the improved protocol is faster than the original CRTDH protocol by a factor of n.
Proof: For proving the above complexity, we can use some results from [4] , m 2 , . . . , m k ) . Given the system S of congruences
2 ) bit operations, and if so, we can find the unique solution (mod m ), using O ((lg m) 2 ) bit operations.
From the above Corollary 4.2.4, it can be obtained that the time complexity for computing lcm (u, v 
Let us analyze CRTDH first. The time complexity of CRTDH mainly comes from two operations: computing lcm i and then solving crt i . There are are at least two ways to compute
The first one is by the linearly recursive formation:
A second method is by the binary recursive formation: With regard to the improved protocol, by the above Corollary 5.5.6, computing every crt ij requires O ((lg p) 2 ). There are n−1 crt ij , so the total time complexity in the improved protocol is O(n(lg p)
2 ). As a result, the improved protocol is more efficient than the CRTDH protocol by a factor of n.
2
As for the communication complexity, crt i will be of length (n − 1)(lg p) bits and the combination of all crt ij will also have length of (n − 1)(lg p) bits. Therefore, the two protocols have the same communication cost. We performed the experiments for computing the CRT values on a DELL laptop with a 1.8GHz Intel(R) Pentium (R) M processor and 1GB RAM under Windows XP using JAVA. The running time for each category is averaged over 100 runs. The experimental results validate the theoretical analysis. For example, when p is a 32-bit, 64-bit prime respectively, and the number of members n is 64, 128, 256, 512, and 1024, the running times in terms of nanoseconds for computing lcm i , crt i (in the CRTDH protocol) and crt ij (in the improved protocol) are shown in Tables 1 and 2 , also shown in Figures 1 and 2 . It is worth pointing out that one other modification to the CRTDH protocol is to form the congruences for all m ij and compute one overall CRT value:
. . .
There are some problems with this solution. At first, the time complexity for computing the above crt i is O(n 2 lg p), rather than O(nlg p). Secondly, it is required that all m ij be pairwise co-prime, which is difficult to achieve. Whenever there are some m ij which are not co-prime, there is a need to ask the related members to reselect a new x i , recompute y i , and recompute m ij . This process may require several repetitions, and consequently is inefficient.
Conclusion
In this paper, we point out three problems that are present in the CRTDH protocol and propose corresponding solutions. We also analyze the performance of our improved protocol and compare it with the original CRTDH protocol, both theoretically and by experiments. The results show that the improved protocol has higher efficiency than the original CRTDH. The improved protocol also has higher security strength than the original CRTDH when some of the m ij are small.
